The TV series directed by Zhora Kryzhovnikova tells about the so-called Kazan phenomenon. That is, about the youth gangs that roamed the streets of the capital of Tatarstan from the 1970s to the beginning of the 21st century. The action takes place during perestroika. The title “mother” has nothing to do with the Polish meaning of the word. Literally means “equal boy” in Russian. In the youth slang of the time, gang members were called “chumps”. These groups took their names from the specific neighborhoods, houses, or streets where their adults lived. In brutal battles with fists, bars and metal pipes, they battled gangs in neighboring neighborhoods, tenements and streets. In this way, they “split the asphalt”, that is, designated their spheres of influence. There was indeed military discipline and hierarchy in the groups, which was unheard of in other cities of the USSR. “Pakan” could theoretically count on the support of his gang, and his enemies mostly clashed during pre-prepared battles. By default, such an enemy should be hated and respected. “Chushpan” (slang from the Russian “chuzhoi”, which means unknown – editor's note) could not count on respect. This was the name of those who did not belong to any gang. The titular “idiot's word” is a promise that the idiot, theoretically, could not break. If he did not present it to Chushpan – then he did not act. Those who did not belong to any gang could be beaten, robbed and humiliated with impunity and no one would support them.
And that's why one of the main characters of the series, Andrei, a student of the Friday music school, decides to join the gang. He does not want to be humiliated, beaten and robbed. In a short time, as in Zimbardo's experiment, he himself begins to be humiliated, beaten and robbed. He remains the best student, but with banditry. Marat, who introduced Andrei to the group, follows a different path. I don't want to reveal too much of the plot, because I hope that whoever reads these words will benefit from my recommendation. So, I will write only this: Marat at some point, under the influence of a tragic experience, begins to notice that even the street morality of “Mother” is one big fraud. Will this revelation last and will it lead to an exemplary transformation of the hero or vice versa? I won't reveal that. By the way, this is a very interesting character, brilliantly and authentically played by Rusil Minikaev.
“The Word of a Fool” has become the most popular and the most rated TV series in the recent history of Russia. It has also won the hearts of viewers abroad. In general, this is a pop culture phenomenon in the Russian-speaking world. It is interesting that in Russia and Ukraine there are ideas to ban its broadcasting. The fact that it is a Russian TV series, filmed with state money, causes controversy about Dnepr. Moreover, it seems to contain the romanticization of Soviet times. And finally, in one of the episodes, there is an inscription on the school board saying “February 24th”, which can hardly be considered a coincidence. However, Ukrainians do not listen to these critical voices and watch the series en masse. On the other hand, in Russia, people outraged by the “speech of a fool” include, among others: the authorities of Tatarstan, that is, the republic whose capital is Kazan. The calls to ban the broadcasts are justified by the fact that the youth imitate the serials and thus become demoralized. However, it seems to be the other way around – the series describes reality, not creates it. Since the story of Andrei and Marat captured the hearts of the audience, every case of violence against juvenile delinquents in Russia has been interpreted by some commentators in the context of a “fool's speech”. There are accusations that Zhora Kryzhnikov's work typifies the romanticization of banditry in Russian popular culture (and elsewhere). In a country where, figuratively speaking, during the seven decades of communism, half the population was imprisoned in the gulag, and the other half was informed by them, then locked in the gulag and guarded from the height of guard boxes, the fascination with crime is understandable. However, many film critics – with whom I completely agree – deny that the series romanticizes evil. On the contrary. Although some of the “mothers” evoke sympathy as complex or tragic characters, the general message is clear – street gangs are places of absolute evil that cannot be justified or glorified.
Russian oppositionist Maksym Kac put forward an interesting theory. In his opinion, Kryzhnikov accidentally filmed a series about Putin and his entourage. Coincidentally, because the creators of the series are not dissidents, and there is no indication that they consciously want to confront the authorities. According to Kachi, the Kremlin is just such a street gang. Putin sometimes uses the language of the street. And his policy is banditry, but at the same time bold and risky. “Chumps” (from TV shows or from the Kremlin), for whom violence is the reason and the only way to solve any problem, increase their self-esteem by persecuting the weak, or “Chushpans”. They use moralistic rhetoric, full of phrases like “We do not leave our own” (“We do not leave our own” – this is the slogan of the Russian army), and in favorable circumstances they will deceive anyone. And “chump” can become “chuspan” in the blink of an eye. This was the case with Prigogine. Putin was not going to keep the security guarantees given to him, because Prigozhin “retired from the gang”.
This theory deserves your attention. But I will expand it further and fill it with other contexts. Marat, introducing Andrei to the gang, instructs: “Remember, now you are a clown, you are on the street and there are only enemies around you.” This is the credo of the street world. But this is the credo of Russia – both modern and historical, which for centuries considered itself a “sieged fortress”, which enemy gangs are trying to conquer. Or rather, the hostile, thuggish West. Even the question of methods brings “clowns” closer to Putin and his predecessors on the Moscow (ie St. Petersburg) throne. On the one hand, Moscow has traditionally aspired to the role of the Third Rome, the pillar of morality, the defender of the true faith (Orthodox, Communist – it doesn't matter) against the corrupt West (Nazi, capitalist, NATO). doesn't matter). A pocket version of this pathos is the distorted ethics of “mothers”. On the other hand, Russians often openly admit that they use violence and rape in foreign policy, but immediately add that this violence and rape is justified. This is due to the need to protect its own people (like “liberating” the Russians living in Ukraine) and because the West is just as aggressive, so Russia is just doing the same, but at least it doesn't show off. Bastion of democracy and tolerance. Describe the world of Kazan gangs who only defend their territory (and people) against other gangs. It's the way of the world – you're either stupid or dirty. So you're either an aggressive power like Russia or the United States, or you're a small, weak power, a small country like Poland or Ukraine. An empire of idiots fights another empire of idiots on equal terms and despises the little ones. Chushpans must be obeyed. They have to choose which street they want to be on – Russian or American. And when such a boy grows up a little, he is treated as an enemy idiot. This is the case of Poland. As Warsaw pursues an active eastern policy, Moscow warns that Polish imperialism is reviving and that Poland wants to annex Lviv. This means that a new hostile gang appears that wants to take over “someone else's asphalt”. From this perspective, asphalt is simply the world, that is, a large geopolitical chessboard. Russian idiots do not realize that the spiral of violence and banditry has passed. You are either a bandit or a loser. Partnerships, helping neighbors – it's impossible, it must be a trick. I am sure that the narrative that Poland wants to conquer it under the guise of helping Ukraine is not just a propaganda invention. Russians may think so. Because they only see the world in terms of gang warfare.
If we take the “word of a fool” as a metaphor for Russian foreign policy, it does not necessarily have to be a critical metaphor. Many viewers may be impressed by this gangster fight. Because this is the Russian mentality – accustomed to the law of the strongest and violence. And the deception and persecution of Chuspans will not harm the audience if the audience sees them as traitors or representatives of hostile countries.
Kryzhnikov's series is another proof of the extent to which prominent (by no means propagandistic) Russian culture is addicted to images of violence. And what a big role that violence plays in this culture. I am reminded of two masterpieces of Russian literature created during the Stalin period: “The Silent Level” by Mikhail Sholokhov and “The Master and Margarita” by Mikhail Bulgakov. The first novel was published, and the second was in the drawer for many years. Most importantly, however, both works had one thing in common: the glorification of violence. “Silent Level” is about the civil war in Russia. The main character vacillates between the whites and the reds, and ends up siding with the whites. Both sides of the conflict are equally cruel, brutal and immoral. And yet Stalin allowed it to be published. why There are at least two reasons. First, because it is an image of ubiquitous violence and brutality, which is an evil in the given situation, but a necessary evil. Second, because the chaos of the civil war shows that Russia is a barrel that needs a hoop. That is, the strong hand of the dictator, because only he can control this bloody element of rebellion. In The Master and Margarita, Satan Woland is to petty scoundrels as Stalin is to the “Old Bolsheviks.” This is also an evil, but a necessary evil. And “Słowo pacana” can be considered in a similar context. An image of cruelty, which is an inherent feature of Russianness. Barrel without ring. In this context, the series can also be interpreted as – consciously or not – a veiled praise of a powerful force. Because the element of banditry can only be fought with the iron grip of the noose. Crying mothers of hooligans evoke sympathy and perhaps even pity. Only the state – the militia and the Komsomol – have the appropriate resources. They act brutally, at the edge of the law or beyond it, but they have no choice. And then there is the context of a kind of street justice that is carried out with the consent of the state. The head of the local Komsomol department puts one of the idiots on the side of the state and instead allows him to take personal revenge. Therefore, the state has the right to act outside the law. The hoop is metal, not plush. And so it should be.
However, these are only interpretive suggestions. Everyone can understand the “word of a fool” in their own way. It contains both praise and criticism of the government. All these interpretations are legitimate and can be defended by citations from the series. However, none of them can be considered as the only correct one. And this shows that “The Word of a Fool” is an outstanding work that has nothing to do with propaganda. This is simply a brilliantly shot series that can be watched with bated breath regardless of the viewer's perspective.
(tags translated)Putin